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IN 'I'!!E SUPHL11E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

pJiUCI! f!OIH::S,

INC. ,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 15467

GREW'J::f'. PARl< CI'l'Y CORPORATION,

Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages for breach of contract.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a trial, the court entered judgment in favor of
plaintiff for the sum of $42,587, with interest.thereon from
J.lay 1, 1975, in the amount of $6,196.12, for a total judgment of $48,783.12, plus plaintiff's costs of $655.30.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, Ranch Homes, Inc., seeks affirmance of the
judgment of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ranch Homes, Inc., is a closely held Utah corporation
formcd in the summer of 1974 by James D. Fahs, Jr., G. Michael
Tuckett and Grant

s.

Kesler.

Prior to their association in
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Ranch Homes, Fahs h0d Lxeen emnloyed
by appcJ
•
- -L:mt , Cr
- ea t er
Park City Company ("CPCC"), designing condominiums, doing
subdivision la••outs,
manaqing
construction, and preparing
;
~
feasibility studies for housin9 in the Park City area
(R 590); Tuckett had been a GPCC project engineer (R 67 4);
and Kesler l1i1d bc:c:n in private: law practice in Salt Lake
City.
Robert H. Wells was employed by GPCC from 1971 througl, ,
1975, and was its executive vice-president for the last
three of those years

(R 746).

lis early as December, 1973,

while both Fahs and \·Jells were with GPCC, the two traveled
to California together

(R 591), and during that trip Fahs

discussed with Wells the fact that he and his associates
wanted to develop a residential subdivision in Park City
that would be primarily composed of approximcttely 103 to lOj
lots on a 30-acre parcel of property.

At that time Fahs

told Wells that he believed there was a tremendous market
for an FHA-approved type of subdivision with FHA insured
loans.
During the next 5 to 6 months rahs and Wc:lls carried on
negotiations, discussing at various times 1·1hat Fahs and his
associates were proposing

(R 592).

September 3, 19 7 4, afte:

Fahs and Tuckett had left GPCC and had formed Ranch Hornes,
the two compil.nies entered into a contract, titlccl "Option
Agreement"

(Exhibit 2) under the tc;:rm.s of v'11 i c!i 1<;111ch Homes

- 2 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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paid GPCC $10,000 for an option to purchase approximately 30
acres in the Holiday Ranch area, adjacent to GPCC's own
planned development of housing, equestrian trails, a golf
course, a tennis center and other improvements (R 594,
Exhibit 3) ·
The contract was not a typical option.

It consisted of

16 pages of terms and conditions, many of them relating
specifically to the development planned by Ranch Homes.
In addition to describing the property, establishing
the purchase price, and providing the date and method for
exercise of the option, the contract permitted Ranch Homes
to receive conveyances of 10-acre parcels of property upon
the payment by Ranch Homes of the per acre price (Ex.

~

•6).

It provided that the property would be utilized as the site
for the development, construction and utilization of no more
than one hundred and five single-family residential home
sites and homes, and that for a period of twenty years,
none of the option property could be utilized for any other
purpose without GPCC's prior written consent (Ex. 2, •lO).
Ranch Hornes and parties purchasing from it were not to
construct any improvements, buildings or structures upon the
option property without GPCC having first approved the
detailed plans and specifications, and it was acknowledged
and agreed by Ranch Homes that all decisions as to the
acceptabil .i ty or approval of such plans and specifications
- 3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"""'
would be in GPCC's sole and Ullrcslrictcd discretion.

In

order to obtain such approval, nanch Hornes or the Purtio~
purchasing from it 1·wre to fjubrnit copies of propo:jed Plans
and specifications, and if GPCC did not approve the Plan ·,
, 11.
was to indicate the portions that it didn't approve,

whe~-

upon revised plans might be submi ttE:,d.
Ranch llomes also agreed that the improvements, buildins
or structures would be construe tcd in accordance with the
plans and specifications approved by CPCC and that complete.:
streets and utility installations would be subject to accep·
tance by GPCC as being constructed in accordanccc with said
approved plan and specifications

(Ex. 2,

~

11).

Ranch Hornes and its authorized representatives were to
have the right, prior to the exercise of the option, to
enter upon the property for the purpose of examining and
investigating it, though it was not to alter the surface cl
the property until it had exercised the option (Ex. 2, Ii
12).

GPCC acknowledg2d its intention to construct an 18-hole
golf course in the area and agreed that a designated area
would not be used for any other purpose for a period of ten
years

(Ex. 2,

~

19).

GPCC agreed that if the option were exercised it would
install or cause to be installed an eight-inch water line
and an eight-inch se-...'er line extending from tlic trunk line

- 4 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to the watc1 and sewer system of Park City Municipal Corporation; unclen_p:ound electrical lines; a paved roadway to the
boundary of the option property; and a drainage system.
construction of the road and utilities, a major undertaking,
would have cost about $500,000

(R 774), and GPCC agreed that

in event of exercise of the option it would provide assurance in a form satisfactory to Ranch's construction lender
that its obligation to install the utilities and roadway
would be fulfilled

(Ex.

2, 11 20).

Ranch Homes agreed that it would discharge all liabilities arising out of activities upon or in connection with
the option property prior to the conveyance dates

(Ex. 2, '

24), and that in the event of construction prior to the
conveyance dates it would furnish a payment bond to GPCC
(Ex. 2,

II 25).

Ranch Homes was to provide insurance, was to

comply with all federal, state and local laws, regulations,
rules and orders

(Ex. 2, '

26), and paragraph 29 of the

contract contemplated that Ranch Homes might engage in
presale activities, including execution of purchase agreements prior to the conveyance dates.
The option was to be exercised by giving written notice
to CPCC on or before 5:00 o'clock p.m. on April 1, 1975 (Ex.
2, \! 11 2 and 3) .

After the option agreement was entered into, it was
neclc1Sooary fo.c Hilncl1 Jlorncs to perform a great deal of preparalor',

'Jl:t:L

lu c](\LC'rminc 1·.'hether it would be to the company's
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-

5 -

-advant.:i.gc to exercise the option and p.:i.y Lo GPCC the amour,
approximately $500, 000 over tl1e next fout: yeat:s includinq
$50,000 within one month after exercise of the option.
Accordingly, the company's officers set about dcv12loping Uc
plans.

l\t thilt time the property,

which hud recently been

annexed by Park City, was unzoned, and the city Wils in the
process of rcwri ting its entire zoning ordin.:i.nce (R 594).
In order to achieve the zoning necessary to permit
development of the property, Fahs, as president of

Ran~

Homes, Inc. , met with the city's master plan conuni ttee to
obtain approval of the cluster housing needed to develop 3.i
units per acre, this density being necessary to make the R2r.
Homes plan work.

The plan of Ranch Homes was

approved~~

City in early 1975 and sent to the planning comr,1ission.
approval by the city council
1975

WilS

fir.

obtained in March or April

(R 594).
It was also necessary for the company to obtain FHA

approval of the project, which required preparation of final

architectural drawings as a prerequisi tc to an Flll\ appraisal.
The appraisal would pETmi t
the houses.

the company to place a value on

In the spring of 197S, Ranch Homes succeeded i:i

obtaining an "ASP-9" feasibility letter from FHA (R 595-5%).

While this was going on, Fahs was also negotiating with
·
·
·t
·
·
insti·utions,
mee t ing
1 en d ing

0

1·.'J

for financing of the subdivision
-

6 -

t11 tl1c·1n
. rc.1·Je'~1·cdly
. u . . . - to i:irrar•s
(R S9G).
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)(irnc

h JJc;: 1<2s had to produce: plans and specifications for

the l cck1·c1l Jluu.':inc; /1Utburity for the project generally,
inclurlinc_i cl fJr,or plon, elevations, sections, and construction
deti;il; tyf1L:
shingles,

o[

concrete; the soil bearing pressure; lumber,

and so forth.

Par!: City,

Feasibility studies were needed for

for the Federal Housing Authority, and for financ-

ing institutions

(R 597).

For FHA approval it was necessary

to prepare a certified soil survey.

Tuckett prepared plans

for off-site improvements, including 30 sheets of drawings
for road profiles,

sewer, water, and curb and gutter.

The

cul-de-sac design required more engineering in order to
obtain city approval (R 598).
Ranch Ho1,1es was told by the lending institutions that the
lenders vould need assurances that the road and utilities
prori1iscd by GPCC would in fact be built

requested the assurances from Wells
w~sn't

(R 607, 608).

Fahs

(R 610), but was told that

going to build the road and utilities

(R 611).

The parties attempted to work something else out.

Various

GPCC

meet

i.lFJS

1·;crc hec>ld and various proposals were made by GPCC

(R G12), but the assurances were never received.
19'/'J,

On April 1,

prior to S:OO o'clock p.m., a letter exercising the

opL~on ~a~

drlivered to GPCC and in accordance with the terms

of the co1!~r;:1cl·_, closing of the transaction was set for
Jip1il

:;o,

l'J'h zct. 10:00 o'clock a.m.

(Ex. 1).

Ranch Homes

- 7 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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officers 1·1erc sent by GPCC to Los l\n~ie:lc~; to tall; w1· tl·i
Prell of Union lv1icrica, lr•c., the company lh:1t Has to

Don
0

,,.m

Holiday Ranch ziftcr a rcorganizcction then in pro0rc:,s ()( GJ:
Ru.nch Jlorncs never did receive any u.ssLir<tncc,s that the
road'.·1ay u.nd uti litics wc•nld be built, but \·.'ere told by GPcc
and by Don Pre 11 th0 t

they woulc1 not be built.

Accordingly,

when tlw time fo:c closing the trcinsaction arrived on April:.
1975, Ranch Homes relied upon GPCC' s rnanifccstation tho.t it"·
not going to perform and did not attempt to close the transaction

(R 615).

In reliance on its contract 1·1i th GPCC, Ranch Homos
spent $27,587,

including $2,587.39 advanced by a related

corporu.tion in which the Ranch Homes principals were involv'
(R 599-603, Exhibits 5 and 6).

In addition, the officers

of Ranch Homes performed other valuable services for whict
they expscted to be paid

(R 627-677).

There was testimony

that the services performed by Fahs we:ce worth $17,500,
over and above the compensation he had received from Ranct
Homes

(R 628), and that the value of the plans and specifi-

cations prepared by 'l'uckett,
was $2G,OOO

for VIhich he had not been paid,

(R 676).

The case 1-1as tried t11ice, once to a j u:ry and once to
the co·u:ct.

In the first trial the jury returned a verdict

in L:ivor of pL·>ir1tiff fo:c $27, S87 out·-of-1_,,:Jc]:ct c/:[KnJi.tur 2''
and $16,000 loc"t

bu:~inccs:c: profit-.~_;,
8 -

thE" courl: Jo.Jving refused
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to sulJ1,:it to the: jury the question of the value of services
performed by corporate officers

(R 92).

mo'cion, the court g1-anted a new trial.

On appellant's
At the beginning of

the second trial, the court ruled that the value of the
services of corporate officers were recoverable, but that
anticipated profits were not.

After the trial, the court

found that Ranch Homes had spent the sum of $27,587, and
U1rcugh its officers had performed services of a value of

$15,000 in reasonable reliance on the contract.

It entered

judgment accordingly with interest and costs.
Other facts relating specifically to the points raised
by app2llant will be discussed in the arguments to which they

are germ2ne.
ARGUMENT
I

Plaintiff's expenditures were reasonable, were made in
reliari_ce on the con.tract, and were foreseeable at the time
the contract was made.
We have no quarrel with the rule of foreseeability as
it relates to the determination of damages for breach of
con true\-..

The rule has been stated with minor variations

sine,, :i.ts pronouncement in 1854 in the landmark case of

\'ihccTc· t1.m p::rti.cs have mac1c a contract which one of
i \1,

m h.:t "' b•:CJ :": n, t 112 dcrnciqc s which the othECr party
lo i:, cc,ivc in rcspc~t of such breach of contract

0 1Yjli1.

-

9 -
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should be; such <is. m;:y f«irlv c:11c1 n:c!SOrulily he• cow·.
' l1cr l1-c1_:;J_I.\1
' '
1 l- / , J' .c., ucco1-(Jir: tot~-~
'
ere; cJ c1_-L
nLj~-u.1-,.
9
':u:;uci_J ~cours<~ of th1-r:!Js, :(·r 0i11 ~_;11cJ1 brc·acli of contra::'~'"
l.tscJ J.:, or ;:~ucJJ ~;:_, J.LJ:f. J-t:c~~·uj1(1 1 l] y L•('. S'J.PJ>n~·r cl to h::i
!Jcen ·1n the conh~1"plc1tJc>11 of both p:1rtic1.o, «l. th(; t'.
the.' F1,:c1~ th<_· cunt.rcict, a1: the JJYJ•J.uJ•lo l.'LS\llt of tfr.
br~dch of it.
I·;o\·;, if the s~)(_·cizl L cj_rcur~ 1 ;tl·,ncl-::S ur,c:.~
j

L

'dh1_c]1 i.h·.:; contr.=tct \\1 as

->j

c1-::~lLilly

r.:._dc \·,'ere~

·

!Jy tlic pLJintiJ L; to Llie clcfcn,,!iinl·s, ;::,nd lhu~. knm·;n .
0
both poi: tic'.,, the dci;-,,:,c;cs .C1':.:ull .t nci fro;•1 Ll1:: IJ:cc:uc!, ~:
contJo.ct, which they 11Uulc1 contc11 1)late, v:OL•JCi be the·
2mount of in:juJ·y 1.'hich 11ci.1ld orcJj11c:d Jy fol le•'•·' from a
bre;:ch o.:: contract. unclcr these; spvcidl ci.ccun:c;td;;ces
so Lno·.,:11 a.nu co:11r:;unicalcc3_. * * *
The rule is ildo0tcd in sulJstilncc by Hestatcracnt of
Contracts,

§

330, which provides:

In a1·:u:cC'.ing oarnac;es, compcns,,ti.on is given for only
those injuries tlwt the defe?ndant had rea::;on to fores'.
<is a prob<:'.blc result of his breach 1. 1hee11 the coni:rcict
was mack.
If the injury is one that follows thee brGo:·
in the usual cou,:se of ev<?nts, thc:rc is sufficie:it
reason foi· tlK defcndc;.nt to foresc"'° it; othcn·1ise, it
must be sh01m specificall.y that. the c12fcndant h2d
reason to knuv1 the facts ancl to forc:escc" the injury.
In P0.cific Coast Title In_:';u:rance Comp20y vs. Hc:rUord
AccidPnt and Indc11inity Compciny,

907

7 Utah 2c1 377,

325 P.2dSOi,

(1958), the rule is stated by this court ilS follows:
The rule as to 11hat damucJes arc recoverablco for breach
of contcict is biiscd upon the cuncc::pt of n::zisO'L:ible
foresecabi l j ty th2t loss of such ncPC.2.::_~_c::.1_._il_r:ac-ter
would result fru>i1 the-L:;"c-~icTi:·-·,1·1,c:J_-cfore, lo 11e cornp,,nsa!Jle, the loss rnu::;t rt>ccul t f:rorn the brcz;cli in the
nattP:ol cind usc10.l cour~;c of C\'(?nt.s, so th0t it c0n
fairly and rea1c;on~1bly bc.c: !Oiiic1 th t if the niJldS of tl:e
parties h2d al!\·crlcd to lJ·" -.-;ell 1·.'hL' l the cor:i. 1 <1•:t 1"'d 5
made, 1 os s of sucL charzictcr 1-;ould Ji_r.;o been 1:j thin
thc2..r co11tr--.::•1pl0i~ion.
[1~!.il_.Jh?lsjs ci(!c11..'cl]
!11 tbou-,;11 1: ...: cJo,1'

c

qu;1r.r:c ..1 1n· th t 1L' ru ..J c, w·:' c1o quarrel
•

- 10 -
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iii:c.i c;tcncc tl1:1 t

the opinions of its experts were controlling,

viitli the di ~.regard of contrary evidence, with the attempt to

shift iti; bucclen of proof to the respondent, and with the
treatmcnl of fact issues as if they were law issues.
In its litany of expenditures that were not "foreseeable
and reaso1wble," the aprellant has not considered the general
ch;n,1ctcr of the losses l•'hich would likely result from its
breach of contr.:ict, but only fragments of specific items of
damage.

It has also disregarded those portions of the

testimony Bnd the terms of the contract from which the court
could (and properly did) find foreseeability.
The appellant has treated the contract in this case as
if the only pertinent part was the title.

But as pointed

out in the statement of facts, the agreement was not only an
option, it was a definitive contract relating to the develop-

mcnt of the 30 acres of property in Park City, and the
entire col!tract, including the seven months lead time between
granting of the option and the date for its exercise, shows
knrn . ·ledcie upon the appellant's part that Ranch Homes was
going to proceed with its plan for the development of the
proper t:y.

B0forc the contract vas 0ntered into, Fahs and Robert
Wells of CPCC hild discussed the plans for the property.
Fahc.tr;;(jfi.~(1

(R592):

11::~·-cJ 1·'i_t.li

cli
cJ.·

Mr.

:'.

1

i_-c·;

nr. \'1clls the fact that we wanted to
_ld·- 11tic.l subCLivision in Park City that
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would be primi">rily cornpo:-:c_:d of dpproxirn:11:cly 103 to
lots to a 30-acrc piccr, oi pro:Jcr Ly.
\'le discii::'·"d
various loc.:11- i 011s us to v1hc'rcc 11e thougllL the br'~~ or,,
was.
\\le aJc,() C)'.prcs::cd to him that we folt th<tl tr,,,.
was a trcmcncioti.s rv11:kci:. for an r:1n approved typi:: oI··.
subd:1vis.1on vntl1 prc1vJ.r1:Lnq I'Hl\ J.nsw:cd lo.:rns in thJt
comrnunJty and we thoncJhi: 1.'i:. »10uld be o. succc's:c: and
bzisicc::lly our ncgoi:.icboL:; rcvolv,~d iU:oui-.cl thzt fort
next five to six r•1cmU1s discuss.ing at va.dons tiPt~s r,_
what 11e 11ere pi::oposin<J, the f:act tlv1t he '"'i.l11tcd it to
have some control ond oversee what our pl<rns were Jnd
approve them prior ahead of time so that we were c~
structing so1w?thing in the Holidoy Ri1nch that \.'8ulcJ t;,
an asset to the Ranch as opposed to something that
would be dcctrirn:c;n tal.
The contract itself contcrnpla.ted planning.
was to be permitted to enter

th~

Ranch Her.'

property befcre exercise;'

the option and to make measurement.

The property

1·1as

to be

utilized for development of approximately 105 singk famil;
residential home sites and homes.
to GPCC.

Plans were to be submittc

GPCC was to install or cause to be installed a

roadway and utilities, and "on or before the closing date"
it was to provide Ranch Homes a flow line elevation and the
location of the eight-inch sewer line.

It 1-;as to provide

assurances as to completion of the roadway and utilities~
evidence sa.tisfactory to Ranch Homes' s construction lender
prior to the closing date.

And Ranch llumss lwd tl1c rigl1t

to engage in pre sale activities,

j

ncluding the cx12cution c"

purchase 2greements, prior to the time that any convcy~Ns
were rnccde.
In its "ten-point must not" anitimcnt bc9i.rn1i11g 0t pag:
5 of its brj cf, tliG appellant cl1.:i.llcnc;ccs a numh(:J' of
-

12 -
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items it believes were improperly allowed as damages.
The first item refers to expenditures "incurred prior
to execution of the Option Agreement."

This seems to be tied

tu the argwnent found on pages 9 and 10 of appellant's brief
that Kesler was paid $2,500 for legal work that had included
services rendered prior to the execution of the option
agreement.

But Kesler testified that the value of services

performed after execution of the contract was $2,500, the
amount received (R 689).

There may also be some complaint

that part of the $17,500 claimed for Fahs's managerial
services involved time spent before the contract was entered
into.

If so, it may be presumed that the trial court took

this into account.

The respondent's evidence was that

services performed by Fahs and Tuckett in reliance upon the
contract were valued at $43,500, but this was reduced by the
trial court to $15,000.
The second item refers to expenditures incurred "prior
to plaintiff's exercise of the option on April 1, 1975."
Appellant's complaint about these expenditures is somewhat
vague, and wc assume that the theory is that damages are not
allowable for a period prior to exercise of the option
because there was no contract.

But as will be shown in

Point II of the argument, relating to the measure of damages,
reliance damages were properly awarded.
Items 3 through 7 relate to specific expenditures of
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P laintiff in preparation of 1Jla11s anc1 cl eve 1 oprncn t of thP.
subdivision.

The appellant a0:1i n makc's tlic• rnisL1ke of

ignoring the fi1ct thot the clilm<HJC:S need only be of the
"general character"

fore:~:ceable

bv
the pcirties.
2

T'nc spc-

ci f ic items \'!ere all within the gene'-:tl char01ctcr of
that might of have been expecttcd, viz., expenses for prepar_.
tion, planning, development, obtaining financing, and
arranging sales, for the subdivision.

u,

The eighth item refers to "e2:pcnditures incurred in
incorporation of plaintiff ai1cl in the drc:fting of a prior
limited partnership agrce1t'1ent," which must be a
of Item No. l.

restcttrn.cr.~

The statement refers to sc•rvices of I:esler,

but the respondent's evidence is tho.t these services were
not included in the $2,500 paid to Kesler.
The ninth item refers to e2:pendi tures incurred in the
"drafting of final archi tecturul ancl engineering plans for
all phases of development not1;ithstanding the fact th0.t

o:.i~

Phase I was to be completed in 1975, and incurred before
exercising the option, before receiving FHJ\ approval and
before a constructio;1 loan was approved."

In this connect::

Fahs testified that final architectural drawings had to ~
prepared in order for the I'HA 0ppraiser to place a value or.
the homes, and that this 1-1as nccc.::ssary to obtain financing

for construction of the subdivision (!\ 596).

Al thouyh it
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was the plan o{ Fzrnch Hornes to do the subdivision in three
phases, it was necessary to do the engineering for the
entire project in order "for everything to work''

(R 682).

ThP tenth item refers to ''expenditures incurred for all
of the z1Lovc items even though, as plaintiff finally testificd at the conclusion of the Second Trial, a purchaser
c0t~lc1

hi'_':'c:;___E_ouqht

il

lot from plaintiff and built his own

house urc:'!:l__ it _with out using plaintiff's plans!"

This com-

plaint is based upon a single sentence of Fahs among a
multitude of paragr0.phs, which referred to one of many
The appellant sees more significance in it

proj cction s.

than is warranted by the testimony.

Fahs testified that it

was the company's plan to develop 32 lots, build a model
complex in the cul-de-sac, with four or five model homes,
and presell the homes from the models.

On cross-examination

appellant's counsel asked whether a buyer would be required
to build a Ranch Home house or could buy a lot.

The testi-

mony went like this:

Q.

I see.
So then you would have been willing to
just sell 32 lots and not build houses?

A.

Oh I think we -- we -- we had that as -- in the
back of our minds --

Q.

I

A.

(Continuing)

Q.

SC'C'.

-- but when we went into the project

~nd

this subdiv3sion is a part is it not -- the
first 32 or a part of the one hundred four lot
~;ub.Jivision are they not?
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A.

That's corrccl.
·A:

*

-A

PIUNCE:
I am really confused.
I hav0 been D[>crating uncl<:r the asc·lll•t;>Uon ti'Y"OUC]h a ckjJo::;itirJn ~uid
throucih i.i corn;)lctc trial thcL this gent lc11nn was
to build Lhi i.-ty-t;;o ho.1;cs i,1 accorc1ancc• 'd.i. th tlw tJla••
and specific,1tio11r3 thdL he put out il11c1 no·,·; all of. a ...
sudden he is going -~.o put out thi.rty-t.•:.'O lotr_; and let
people buy the lots und I a1:i rciJ.lly a.stounc1ccJ.
I mo,,,
I am really acotow1clcd to hear that 1-.'<c.· a;_-c not
·--..
about selling hon;c~s crnnplctcC:: for fifty-fivL: tho~oJr.:
c:ny more c:nc1 the Fl!!'. co1;c~:dn1c-,11t doC'sn' t n,1,ari L>i1;
because we are not -- because this was Lac-;ccl on tliGs:
plans and those spccificaticns and ve ilrc not tcilki!labout any particular plan of a house.
I o.m ilbsolutel·.
astounded.
I would like to -- I would like -·

MR.

THE WITNESS:

Sir, thats wrong.

I didn't say that.

* * *
THE WITNESS:
I said to you from the outset and I
always -- my testimony has always been that in or~r~
make this p:coject work you have a land loan that i'Ou
must record on the property and you mu."t clevC'lop thirr·
two lots and we always had the intention of build
model complex of five houses unc1 the rest of the house'
on that devcloprn2nt would be built as they were ~re
sold.
It was a requj rement of the loan and in order
to -- to be able to get that lund loc1n and in orclGr tc
be able to develop even five spec houses and cul-de-so:
for a model complex, it was 0ccessury to prcp8re
architecturz,l plans 1·:llich v:ei_e processed through the
FHA, received il vv.lu:::i.tion so that tho lcncl:::r knuv 1:hJt
the value of that home was so he might loan on it a~
my testift'1ony has been that way.
The testimony shm·:s that the appellant's concerns

ar~

unwarranted, except to the extent tl1at losers' concernc: are
always warranted.
The itemiz2ction used by appcJ L,nt dc rn()n,-;trcitcs tho
1

worth of this court's vic1: that only the qcncrnl chi'11,~cter
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of the damages need have been foreseeable.
supported by other authorities.
§ 1012,

And this view is

In 5 Corbin on Contracts,

we find the following:

Just as reason to foresee does not mean actual foresight, so also it is not required that the facts
actually known to the defendant are enough to enable
hi1:i to foresee that his breach will cause a specific
injury uf a particular amount in money.
If he knew
that his breach would cause the shutdown of a mill, he
had reason to know that his breach would prevent the
sale of its product at market prices.
It is not
rGquirecl that he should be able to foresee just how
many articles would be sold, or to what specific
persons or at what exact prices they would be sold.
What is required is merely that the injury actually
suffered must be one of a kind that the defendant had
reason to foresee and of an amount that is not beyond
the bounds of reasonable prediction.
The appellant seems to treat the question of foreseeability as if it were a question of law, rather than a
question of fact which was decided against it.
In Holt !lanufacturing Co. v. Thornton, 136 Cal. 232, 68
p. 708 (1902), the appellant argued that the question of
whether high winds that had led to increased losses were
"within the contemplation of the parties" should not have
been submitted to the jury but should have been determined
by the court.

The Supreme Court of California said:

In McMahon v. Field, 7 Q.B. Div. 591 Brett, L.J.
speaking of these three questions:
"First, whether the
dam~lgc is a necessary consequence of a breach; secondly,
whether it is the probable consequence; and thirdly,
whetl1cr j t was in the contemplation of the parties when
the contract was made," -- said:
"Those two last are
rath<cr quL'Stions of fact for a jury, than of law for
th~ court, to determine."
The foregoing cases are in
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accord 1.'.i th the wcic1l•c~ of authorj ty on the subJ·c···t
- '-- ,
express the princ.i plc that ,;J-.ould l.Jc cl].J~,} icd to the "
particuldr fi.lcts of tile cz1sc ut bur.

Cl~:

This view is supported by tlic other cases and bi• tc:-:t
writers on damaycs and contracts.
(Hornbook Series), p.

574, we find the fuJlrn-1.i.ng:

If men could reasonc;bJy differ over the objccti\'c
facts relative to the• givinci o[ notice, or over the
question whether, on the fccts thus found, the dc.cfaul te:c should, when the con tract was made, re<Json2bL
have foreseen thL!t such a loss as this would I.Jc tho ·
result of breach, then these' qu<e:stion~c: of fact and tr.e
inference arc to be submitted to the jury.
There is agreement in 5 Corl.1 in on Contracts, § 1012:
The question 1·1hethcr or not the ckfcndiint did in fact
forecec, or had reason to fore: sec, the injur~' that the
plaintiff has suffered is a question of fact for the
jury, subject to the usual supervisory power of the
court. * * *
In support of its contention that the costs incurred

bj'

Ranch HomGs were unforesceablG and unreasonilble, appellant
relies almost entirely upon

(1)

ipse dixit and (2) the

testimony of Mr. Herbert Trayner, a subcli vider and general
contractor who was presented to the court as
ipse dixi t we can meet 1·.'i th ipsC' c1i;:i t

311

expert.

T~

of our own, und the

testimony of Trayner we can meet with the rccogni ti on thJt
it is only an opinion.
P.

401,

404

(1921),

In Byram v. Payne, 58 Utah 53G, 201

the defendant in an action for in:jury to

sheep while aboard a con@on carrier contended that the
testiinony of an expert as to the c0use of dC'<ith of tile shc'-i
shou]d have been z:s conclusive.

-

18 -

In affi.rr:t.illCJ a con1·,-,·1ry
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judgment by the trial court, this court said:
Possibly the jury failed to give to the testimony of
these exl'ert witn,c";-;sc.:s the we_"ight to which it was
entitled, but the weight of testimony, including that
of expert witnesses, is wholly a subject for the
jury's determination.
Doubtless the defendant presented a strong defense, but it is evident from their
verdict that the juro.cs believed the sheepmen and
farmers ond doubted or rejected the testimony of the
veter ino r Lrns and biologists.
It is not within the
province of an appellate court to pass upon the evidence and say that the opinion of the jury was wrong.
Accord, 31 Arn. J1_n: 2d, Expert and Opinion Bvidence, § 183.
The trial court in our case heard the qualifications of
appellant's expert and listened to his testimony.

The court

also listened to the testimony of Ranch Homes's witnesses,
including persons who were trained in architecture, engineering, and the development of subdivisions, and who had,
in fact, been employed for a substantial period of time by
the appellant itself.
One difficulty with Mr. Trayner's testimony is that his
experience was geographically remote.

He had done work in

Salt Lake County and in counties to the north and south, but
had not done any development work in Park City.
familiar with the zoning ordinances there.

He was not

He did not know

what was necessary to accomplish a change in zoning there.
His testimony as to what expenses were reasonable and what
ones were not is entitled to little weight.
Moreover, Trayncr's testimony supports the view that
du111u9e:::; of the g·.~ncral character claimed by Ranch Homes were

- 19 -
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foreseeable.

He testified that the length of time for an

option to run generally would be based on what had to be
done in order to develop the property; that certain

th~~

had to be worked out before a purchaser would know whether
he would want to buy the property

(R 887).

After

obtain~g

the option and before C):ercisinCJ it it would be necessary
for a builder to go through various steps.

The first step

is to arrange for the proper zoning (R 869), in

connecti~

with which it would be necessary to show the ownership of
the property, the density picture, the number of units per
acre, whether the development will be residential, singlefamily, multi-family, conunercial or whatever; preparation of
a preliminary layout showing the configuration to which tle
land is to be put; and work on obtaining a conuni trnent from a
lender (R 874).

He also testified that it was advantageous

to have FHA approval.
The things he was talking about in his testimony are
the kinds of things that Ranch Homes did, and they are

t~

kinds of things that were contemplated by the contract and
by the negotiations that prececded it.

On the basis of all

of the evidence, the trial court properly found -- as a fact
that the damages were foreseeable

(R lGG).

It is submitted that it was the duty of appellirnt to
show that the costs incurred by Ranch Homes were not
able.

reJSO~

A landmark case dealing with the mcusure of cL1mages
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for breach of contract is United States v. Behan, 110 U.S.
338, 4

s.

states

Suprcm~

Ct. 81, 28 L. Ed. 168 (1883), in which the United
Court said:

It does not lie, however, in the mouth of the party who
has voluntarily and wrongfully put an end to the contract, to say that the party injured has not been
damayed at least to the amount of what he has been
induced fairly and in good faith to lay out and expend
(including his own service), after making allowance for
the value of materials on hand; at least it does not
lie in the mouth of the party in fault to say this
unless he can show that the expenses of the party
injured have been extravagant, and unnecessary for the
purpose of carrying out the contract.
The appellant attempted to show that the expenditures
of Ranch Homes were extravagant and unreasonable, but it
relied upon a witness who was unfamiliar with developments
in Park City, and the court was not bound by his opinion.
There are thousands of cases dealing with the foreseeability of damages resulting from breach of contract.

Each

of the cases is different, and each is decided, in large
measure, by the wording of the contract and the special
circumstances communicated to the defendant.

Many of the

cases cited by the appellant relate to consequential damages
which were highly unusual in light of the nature of the
contract entered into.

Ours is not such a case.

The expenses incurred by Ranch Homes are not "collateral,"
as argued by the appellant.

The contract provided for the

purchase and the development of the 30 acres of property
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owned by GPCC, and Ranch Homes was obl iga Ler1 to use> the
property for the develop1<.1ent of a

subdivi~;ion

of 103 to lo;

houses, with plans and specifications to be J.Jresentc•d to ar,
approved by GPCC.

The things that were done by Rctnch Homes

were all done in furtherance of that contract.
That damages of the type sought by Ranch Home>s are
recoverable is also shown by the cases cited in Point II of
this brief, though the Points I and II are necessarily
interrelated and should be considered together.
II

The proper measure of damages in this case consisted
of expenditures made in performance of and in reliance upo:,
the contract plus provable lost profits.
A leading and often cited case dealing with the rneasur;
of damages for breach of contract is United States v. Beh2n,
supra, 110 U.S.

338, 4 S. Ct. 81, 28 L.Ed. 168 (1883),

which involved a government contractor who had expended
money and services in reliance upon a contract with the Unit'
States.

Before complete performance, the contract was

terminated by the government, and in discussing the rneasuu
of damages for the breach, the court said:
The prima facie measure of damages for the breach of a
contract i:s the 0.rnount of the loss whj ch the injured
party has sustained thereby.
If the brcuch co!lsists ill
preventing the performance of the contrilct, wjthout t~
fault of the other party, who is wil l j ng to perfonn it,
the loss of the latter will consjst of two distinct
items or grounds of damage, nzirrtely:
fir~;t, what he
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has alrc~~y expended towards performance (less the
value of materials on hand); secondly, the profits that
he would realize by performing the whole contract.
The court noted that it is not always possible to
recover for loss of profits, because they may be too remote
and speculative in character, but pointed out that the
failure to prove profits will not prevent the party from
recovering his losses for actual outlay in expenditures.
The court added that the party who voluntarily and
wrongfully puts an end to the contract and prevents the
other party from performing it, is estopped from denying
that the injured party has not been damaged to the extent of
his actual loss and outlay fairly incurred.
The relationship between the rule permitting recovery
of out-of-pocket losses and recovery of anticipated profits
is explained in 5 Corbin on Contracts, § 1031:
It is often very difficult to estimate the amount of
profits that have been prevented by the breach of
contract not only because of uncertainty in the happening of a various contingencies, but also because of
difficulty in determining the money value of a promised
performance or ';;he cost of completion by the plaintiff.
There is usually little difficulty, however, in proving
what has already been expended by the plaintiff prior
to the date of breach by way of preparation and part
performance.
The fact that profits are to uncertain
for recovery does not prevent a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff for the amount of his expenditures.

* * *
The present rule allowing the recovery of expenditures
is not an alternative rule that may be applied only in
the cases where profits are too uncertain for recovery.
There arc very many cases in which judgment has been
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given for both the profits and the amount of the
expenditures.
It is entirely proper to do this
provided th~it sufficient care is toJ;cn to u.voill,giv'
inc
a double recovery f or the same clcmL:nt of horm. A '
judgment for profits, when that tccrm is pro;x'rly user'
never in~ludes zmy of the plciinlitf' s coxpcndit.ures iii'
preparation or part perforno.nce.
The~ cost of full
performance by the plaintiff always jncludcs these
expenditures; and
this. totu.l cost must be subtracted
from the contru.ct price in order to clctcrrninc the
amount denominated as profits.
It follows that in
addition to "profits" so computed the plu.intiff is
always entitled to the amount of expenditures that
would have been reimbursed by the pcrforrno.ncc promised
by the defendant before any "profits" would bccgin.
In § 1032, Professor Corbin adds:
The rule in the preceding section must not be limit~
to expenditures in the forrn of pu.yments in money. If
the injured party has, in the course of performance 0 ,
in the preparation therefor, transferred or consumed
property or has performed work and labor of value,
these may be estimated and included along with his ~~
outgo.
In Holt v. United Security Life Insur<:mce
76 N.J.L. 585, 72 A.

&

Trust Co.,

301 (1909), the plaintiff was

award~

damages for expenses incurred in reliance upon an agreement
by the defendant to make a loan.

The loan was for the

purpose of permitting the plaintiff to complete a purchase
of real property, remove the house from the property, and
construct a new building on the property.

In reliance on

the contract, the plaintiff sold the frame building that
stood on the land and proceeded to make contracts with
various parties for the furnishing of materials and doing o'.
construction work on the new building.

While the work was

in progress, the defendant notified the pla:int:iff that it
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was not going to make the loan.

On the question of damages,

the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals said:
Losses directly incurred, as well as gains prevented,
may furnish a legitimate basis for compensation to the
injured party.
And, among such immediate losses,
expenditures fairly incurred in preparation for performance or in part performance of the agreement, where
such expenditures are not otherwise reimbursed, form a
proper subj0ct for consideration where the party injured,
while relying upon his contract, makes such expenditures in anticipation of the advantage that will come
to him from completed performance. Where the profits
that 11ould haveo been lost are shown with such certainty
as to entitle the plaintiff to damages under this head,
we do not mean to say that he may have recovery for his
preliminary outlay in addition; for this would seem to
involve a double recovery.
But where one party repudiates and thus prevents the other from gaining the
contemplated profit, it is not, we think, to be presumed in favor of the wrongdoer (in the absence of
evidence) that complete performance of the agreement
would not have resulted in at least reimbursing the
injured party for his outlay fairly made in part performance of it.
There is no reason why the general contract rule allowing
reliance damages should not apply to contracts or options

for the sale of real property, and the rule has been so
applied.
Kamrncrt Bros. v. Tanque Verde Plaza Co., 102 Ariz. 301,
420 P.2d 678

(1967), involved a contract for the sale of

comn1ercially zoned real estate near Tucson, Arizona.

The

seller breached the contract and the buyer was awarded
da1no.gcs for the breach.

The court allowed both the benefit

of the bargain and out-of-pocket expenses incurred in reliance on the contract.

The out-of-pocket expenses for which

recovery was permitted included principal and interest paid
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on the contract of sale, taxes paid on the land, architectural fees,

topographical map, soil tests, attorney's

fees, accountant's fees, and travel expenses.

In addition,

the court allowed damages for loss of bargain in the amoun+
of $l10, 000.
In Mendoyoma, Inc. , v. County of Mendocino, 9 Cal .Zipp,
3d 193, 87 Cal.Rptr.

740

(1970), the county, having acquirE:

a right to use certain lands of the United States for parL
and recreation purposes, entered into a written

concessi~

agreement with Mendoyoma, giving the company the right to
construct buildings and improvements for the service of the
public and to operate them for a profit.

The county breach'

the agreement, and the court awarded reliance damages to ti;'
company, which award was upheld on appeal.

The trial court,

however, had refused to award any amounts to Mendoyorna for
the time spent by officers of the corporation in endeuvorinc
to perform.

On this point the District Court of Appeals

reversed, indicating that the claim was not directed to MY
compensation due the officers for their service, but rather
to the compensation due the corporation acting through its
officers.

With respect to the denial of an av1ard of $14,2Ji.

for interest which Mendoyma claimed becaus~ ~f a loan it
took to finance the project, this was denied because the
special circumstances surrounding tile formation of the
contract showed that it was tile parties' understanding~~
-
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the project.

\'las

going to be financed by risk capital and not

by a loan.

It was not because the expenditure was "collateral"

as suggested in appellant's brief, page 17.
In Cain Shoes, Inc. v. Gunn, 194 Kan. 381, 399 P.2d
831, 834 (196S), the parties had entered into a lease agreement for property on which plaintiff planned a shoe store.
The owner of the property failed to build the building in
which the store was to be operated and the lessee sued for
damages.

The court said:

In determining what might reasonably have been contemplated, the nature and purpose of the contract, and the
~ttending circumstances known to the parties at the
time the contract was executed, should be considered.

* * *
It is a well established rule in this state that expenditures made in anticipation of, or in preparation for,
the performance of a contract in which default is made
or fulfillment prevented are recoverable (King Bros. v.
Perfection Block Machine Co., 81 Kan. 809, 106 P.
1071).
It would appear quite probable that a party who leased
space for a shoe store in a building to be constructed
for occupancy on a particular date would order shoes in
advance to be available at the opening date.
It would
also appear that shoes being seasonable, a s~rious loss
would occur if the sales location was not made available.
It would further appear probable that the interested parties would attempt to minimize the loss by
finding a substitute location from which the shoes
purchased in anticipation of the lease could be sold.
These are matters which the trial court will give
consideration under the facts and circumstances of the
particular case when the new trial occurs.
In Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948),
action was brought for damages arising out of the failure to
-
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give a dealer's franchise as promised.

Applying cquitab~

estoppel, the court held that the triu.l court wu.s correct
holding the dcfcndu.nts liable for monies that the promis~
had expended in preparing to do business under the promi~d
dealer franchise, even thouc1h there was no cnforc,o 0 lJle
contract.
See, also, Continental Plants Corp. v. Mc0sured
Marketing Service, Inc.

274 Or.

Childress v. Cook, 2'15 F.2d 798

G21, 547 P.2d 13G8 (1976);

-

(5 Cir. 1957); and Brennerr"

v. Auto-Teria, Inc., 260 Or. 513, 491 P.2d 992,995 (1971),•
cases cited therein.
Thus tile cases support the proposition that for bread.
of contract, including those involving real property, the
injured party may recover out-of-pocket costs as well as
benefit of his bargain.

t~

The out-of-pocket costs moreover,

need not be in performance of the contract.

As stated in 5

Corbin on Contracts, § 1035:
There are many expenditures made in reliance upon M
existing contract that cannot be properly regarded as
having been made in part performance of it, or even as
in necessu.ry preparu. ti on for such performance. Such
expenditures as these are not expected to be compensated directly by the payment or other pcrformonce
promised by the defendant, for they do not constitute'
part of the agreed exchange.
Nevertheless, the net
loss involved in such expenditures may be included w
the damages awarded, if at the time the contract was
made the defendant had reason to foresee that such ,.
expenditure would be made and that his 01-m brcilch l'iOUl
prevent their reimbursement.

-
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The c<1~jes dealing with breaches of contracts to sell
real property, where the purposes of the purchase are not
set out in the contract and are not shown to have been known
to the vendor, have no bearing on the case presently before
the court.

Even those cases awarding only the difference

between the value of the property at the time the purchaser
was to have conveyance of it and the price he was then to
pay, recognize that cases may arise where departure from
this rule is permitted.

In their brief, appellants recognize

Neal v. Jefferson, 212 Mass.

517, 523, 99 N.E. 334, 41

L.R.A.N.S. 387, as such a case, but attempt to distinguish
it on the ground that it involved a lease instead of a
purchase and that profits and reliance damages may be the
natural and probable result of the breach of a lease agreement.

It is submitted that they may also be the natural

result of the breach of a contract for the sale of real
property, where the contract contemplates that the property

is going to be developed, subdivided, and sold, particularly
where the developer's plans were communicated to the defaulter.
BunneJ v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P. 2d 597 (1962),
docs not preclude the recovery of reliance damages.

Although

the court in that case mentioned that the measure of damages
was the marl:ct value of the property at the time of the
breach less the contract price to the vendee, there was no hint
in the: case: lhat the out-of-pocket expenses were sought.

-
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A different men sure of c10mz·1gc::; was uppliccl in the

(1926).

There the court indicated thal plaintiff could

receive back what she' lwd paid, noting lhat she h«d not
elected lo sue for p1:ofits or the value of the prop 12 rty.
The Utah cases on damages for breaches of real

esta~

contracts were discussed in the recent opinion of Srni th v.
-~

\\Tarr, 564 P.2d 771

(Utah 1977), in which tlie triul court

awarded the buyer's out-of-pocket loss but denied her
benefit of the barguin dzunagcs, i.e. , the market valL:e of
the property at the time of the breach less the zrnount
the unpaid purchase money.

The issue was whether the

of
b~e~

of the bargain could be award8d in the absence of a shm1inc
of bad faith on the part of the vendor, the parties and f,,
court having been in agreement that out-of-pocket losses
were recoverable.

The court noted that in those cases in

which benefit of the bargain damages had not been awurded,
the buyers had only sought out-of-pocket losses.

l•?e have

been unable to find any Utah case indicating thot out-ofpocket losses cannot be recov8red in case of a contract for
the sale of real property.
On the basis of the foregoj ng, it is clear that the
court applied the proper measure of clamJgcs

or at least

measure of damages that was not prejudicial to GPCC'.
Homes took the position at the tri<1l, and takes j t nm1, tic

-
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in addltion to out-of-pocket losses it should have been
awarded the prof its it would have made in the d~velopment
and sale of the real properties being purchased from GPCC.
The point is made here primarily to emphasize the fact that
GPCC has had the benefit of two trials and has had applied
to the case a damage rule that is to its benefit, since the
award of $16,000 loss of profits in the first trial was
taken away from Lhe respondent in the second trial.
The trial court's findings of reliance, reasonableness,
and foreseeability were fully justified by the evidence.
Under appellant's theory and the testimony of its appraiser,
Ranch Homes wouldn't even be entitled to return of the
$10,000 it gave for the option, and might owe something to
GPCC for preventing it from performing such a disadvantageous
contract.
III

The evidence does not support appellant's contention
that Ra!ich Homes failed to mitigate its damaqes.
Failure to mitigate damages is an affirmative defense
as to which the appellant had the burden of proof.
In this case, GPCC attempted to show that Ranch Homes's
damages could have been mitigated, producing evidence that
during negotiations following the repudiation of the contract

by CPCC, certain other properties were offered to Ranch
Homes at varying prices.

The proof of GPCC in this regard

-
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fails in several particulars.

The most important of them ;c

that nov:liere in the testimony is there any evidence

its

to

how or to what extent the damages would have been mit;g at Et
..1.

if Ranch Hornes had bought one of the parcels of property ori
terms offered to it by appellant.
The testimony of witnesses for Ronch Hornes was that U.o
damages, i.e., the out-of-pocket expenses, were incurredh
developing the plans and specifications, obtaining zoning,
and preparing the material for presentation to the FHA and
to financing institutions for development of the 105

lots~

the property under option.

~e

They also testified that

plans and specifications, architectural drawings, and engineering drawings that were prepared by them, in fact
the work that was done by them had no value and could
used for any other piece of property.

all~
n~b

But the defendants

have merely thrown toward the court the possibility of some
other pieces of property being acquired at a better price,
suggesting that, since this is true, the respondent did
mitigate its damages.

n~

But there was no evidence as to what

could have been done with the property, what profits might
have been made, or how the purchase of other property wou~d
have aided the respondent in reducing the losses it had
already suffered.
Besides, the proposals made were not advant<lgeous ~
Ranch Homes.

Fahs testified that the original alternati~
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thJl

w~s

proposed consisted of three 10-acre parcels com-

prising 30 ucrcs for the price of $10,000, and Ranch Homes

made a counteroffer to purchase the property for $8,000.

It

was Falis' opjnion that thco 30-acre parccol was not worth
$10,000 an acre, and that the work already done would not be
useable on the substitute 30 acres

(R 944).

Other offers

were made with respect to 56 acres, but after a meeting it
was agreed urnong all of the parties that the proposal was
not 11orkalJle, and that they ought to try to do something
else (R 944).

Development of the 56 acres would have re-

quired Ranch Homes to borrow money against the property and
construct the utilities that had been planned to be constructed by GPCC, which would have cost $500,000 or so (R 947).
This proposal fell through and the parties were never able
to agree on it

(R 944).

As to another 58-acre parcel, the

work previously done by Ranch Homes would have been of no
use (R 947-948).
In addition to the fact that the appellant has failed
to show how Ranch Homes' damages would have been mitigated

by any of the proposals that were discussed, there are
certain rules relating to mitigation of damages which defeat
this defense.
The doctrine of mitigation as applied to contracts is
more often rcf Prred to as the doctrine of avoidable consequence-,;,

a1H1

it is not as broad as appellant takes it to be.

- 33 -
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As stated in 22 Jun Jur /'d,

Dam:1_2_c:::_;~_].2:

The? innocC'nt party is not r<:'quired to tziLc cxtraorct· .
.' 1 tl 1c ..J os~oes J:rom tie
l
ln,,,
e ff·orts to avoJ.c
brccich of cont--.:
nor is he expccLed to incur risl:s or spend substanti;;
sums of rnone:i' to pro t cc t the def a ul tc J •
Nor need h ·
sacrifice a suJ·1';tantii1l right of his 01111 in orclor te
minimize ),j s loss.
z,11 that is required of the non~
defaulting party -- in meilsurinq his damiiges -- is th-he act reas,onably so as not unduly to enhance the
'·
damages caused by the breach.
If the court determines
that he has not actC'd reasonably to avoid damac;cs, the
actual award of damages for the breach wi 11 be rC'duce'
by the amount which could have reasonubly avoided. "
r

It is also stated that "it is not necessary for th 8
plaintiff to make another contract with the defendant

w~

has repudiated, even though it offers terms that would
result in avoiding loss."
272.

5 Corbin on Contrarts § 1043, p,

It was stated in Questo v. Dur ado, 136 Cal. App. 2d

332, 288 P.2d

529, 531 (1955), that

l'lhile it was the duty of defendzmt "to exercise reasonable care to minimize anticipated damages growing out
of the breach of a contract" * ~, * it was not for him
to assume the burden of the wrongdoer nor to incur
relatively large expenses on that account.
In 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages, § 37, it is said that
Courts generally do not determine damages based upon
the making of these expenditures unless (1) tht'y are
small in corr.parision to the possible losses, and (2) i:
is virtually certain that the risk incurred will avoid
at least a part of the loss.
Dam.:.iges will not be
decreased through showing that ·a substantial expenditure would hClve minimized the total loss or t.hat the
suggested expenditure may or may not have decreased .
damuges.
'fhe defaulter is in no position to cast th1 5
risk of substantial expenditures on the plaintiff.
Since such risks arose becuuc;e of the l.ll."cach, they are
to be born by the defaulting party.

-
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see, also, Double D Amusement Co. v. Hawkins, 20 Utah 2d
395 1 1]38 P.2d 811, 812
Forq_c~~_I_nc.,

(1968); Theis v. duPont, Glore

212 Kan. 301, 510 p.2d 1212, 1218 (1973); and

Restatement of Contracts, § 336, Conunent a.
The only evidence offered by appellant on mitigation of
damages was that it would have sold some other parcels of
property to Ranch Homes for substantial sums of money.

This

would have required Ranch Homes to enter into a new contract
with the defaulting party, put up substantial sums of money,
and enter into some kind of a development that differed
materially from what it had planned.

Moreover, the efforts

that they had already made and which were uncompensated
would not have been paid for by the development.

The appellant

having offered no evidence as to the profit respondent might
have made by accepting one of its propositions, there is no
basis for determining what amount, if any, might be deducted
from the damages awarded to Ranch Homes.

IV
Interest was properly added to the damages awarded to
Ranch Homes.
In challenging the court's award of prejudgment interest,
the appellant relies almost entirely on cases outside Utah.
This is understandable, inasmuch as the law has been settled
in Utah for 70 years that if the injury and consequent
damage~ are complete,

and the damages can be determined by a
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fixed standard of value, rather than Ly tlw judcJment of
trier of fact, prejuuc)lnvnt intcrc:;t- is allrn.'<:iblc.

tr,

Thi::;

court has not been troubled by the "liquidctlc·cl-unliguidatc,
dichotomy.
Appellant is correct in stat ins that tlw Ltw of Utah
with respect to jJrejudgrn:::nt interest was este<Llished in the
early case of Fell v. Union Pacj fie R';. Co._ 32
P. 1003

Utah 101, 1

(1907), but incorrect in its characterization of

what Fell held.
That case involved a claim for damages resulting

fr~

the death of and injury to sheep shipped via the defendant
railroad.

The case contains an excellent discussion by

Justice Frick as to the varying views on liquidated and
unliquidated damages and the reason for allowing recovecy
when the injury is complete.

The court rejectc::d the vie1·: c'

some courts that interest shouldn't run against a dcfcndar.:
until he knows how much he should pay.
that if the injury is complete, an auard of interest is
necessary in order to fully compensate the injured party.
The court said:

* * * if a person's property is dcstroycc1 or damaged,
why is he riot entitled to be com;-icnsatcd to the rull
extent of its value in money f;o Lhat he in:1J rcpli1c8 tf<c
same with other property of o like naturEl If on t~
day of its injury or destruction he ru;lorcs or r~plcc:
it Hith his own money, why is he not c11titlod to interc
on that money to the date of rcpoymcnt '? If he, hJcl
loaned the rnr,n0y to 1-;omconc, ]1r: c<'1-ti:_i n-1 y 1-1uulcl lx
entitled to intc:rc:_;t, crnd, j f he borro -c1 -i l: from
SO!l1 80ne, he v·oulu lib:ly ln'.'C' lo J>ilY i11l:c1,·rl !r·r its
use.
By bci11g i111il1c1rd lcq,Jl i11t•:1c1;t, ll1ut 1 u1c, licl
1
_, ..
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simply pl<.1ccd in stc1tu quo, aud nothing short of this
is full cornuensation, and that is just what the law
aims to accomplish.
Is it an answer to say that the
damages ar0 unliguidated, and therefore interest is not
lo be allowed? This, to our minds, is no reason at all
in Cilc.;c of injury to or destruction of property.
In
all :;uch cases the party sustaining the loss is limited
in hj s rc•covery to the market or actual value of the
property at the time of the injury or destruction.
Moreover, he must establish the amount of the loss by
some fixed rule or standard, and the evidence must be
confined thereto, and either the court or jury must
find the value in accordance with the evidence.
In the
class of cases, therefore, where the damage is complete,
and the amount of the loss if fixed as of a particular
time, there is -- there can be -- no reason why interest
should be withheld merely because the damages are
unliquidated.
The court distinguished cases where damages are establishcd by some fixed rule or standard, from those in which
the damages are determined by the judgment of the finder of
fact, pointing out that in the latter type of cases the
damages are incomplete up to the trial, and are "peculiarly
within the province of the jury to assess at the time of the
trial."

Types of actions the court is talking about in this

exception are personal injury, death by wrongful act,
libel, slander, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution,
assault and battery, and the like.
In concluding its opinion, the court said:
The true test to be applied as to whether interest
should be allowed before judgment in a given case or
not is, therefore, not whether the damages are unliquidatcd or otherwise, but whether the injury and
consequent damages are complete and must be ascertained
as of a particuiar tin~ and in accordance with fixed
rules o I c'd de rice and knOl·m standards of value, which
tl1c collrt or jury must follow when fixing the amount,
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rather then be quidccl by tlie:ir best judqrnent in assr.·.
the amount lo be itl lu·.. cc1 for p<1 ·; t as 1-.'r~ l l as for
••
1
injury, or for clc'InC'\ts th,•t cC111not be rnc•i1surccJ b·.· ;:
fixed stu.nrJc;rd of Vitluc·.
'j'hc :;,,me ruJ1· unrJcr i.hn ... c.
concli ti o.ri_'.:'._1 ·02:1 lcl oi _l_'!'!:.'.£2·' 1~C"~~~I·r~U_lo-i.;-(· ·~To~1s--for~
of controct. ' "' ''
(crnph<1:c;is c1cic1c:cl) .----------.:.:...

fu;

The rules laid down in Fe] l
or seriously chdllcngecl,

<~nd

liavc nc;vcr 1.Jcen ovorrulcc

havL'

bc~cn

folJ ov1c·d in mirncrk

other cases decided by this court.
In KirnbalJ. v.
397,

Salt

Lci.l~~City,

32 Utah 2S3, 90 P. 395,

(1907), interest was allowed on a claim for darnag 2 s t:

real property arising out of the change of grade of a
street.
In Jack B. Parson Construction Company v. StatP of
Utah, 552 P.2d 107

(Utah 1976), prejudgment interest 1-.•as

allowed in connection with a construction contract, the
contractor claiming what was essenLially an equitable adju'·
ment in price, although the parties were poles apart witt
respect to the amount due.
In Wunderlich Contracting Company v. Unitea States
ex rel. Reischel and Cottrell, 240 F.2d 201

(10th Cir.

1957), the Court of Appeols, opplying Utah law, approved tf<,
award of prejudgment interest in a case thal was based upoc
quantum meruit, or the reasonable value of labor and rno~n
furnished by a subcontractor to a contractor.
In Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. \1'hi.le SupPLi.or Co., 54G p,;:
885, 887

(Utah 197G), a case in which prejuC:!C)nicnt interest

-
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was al lov.'cd for dilmage to a compressor station, the court
cites a

nu~Jcr

of other cases in which the Fell decision has

been followed by the Utah court.
We will make no

atteu~t

to distinguish the cases cited

by appellant because those cases are representative of a

philosophy of interest in which "liquidated" is the key
word.

They are not in harmony with the Utah philosophy of

interest as it has been applied since Fell.
within the rule established by Fell.

This case comes

The plaintiff's

damages were computed on the basis of out-of-pocket expenditures, shown by the books and records of the company; by
the value of architectural drawings, engineering plans and
specifications, established by testimony of experts; and by
the value of services performed by Fahs as manager of the
project, also established by testimony.

These were not

damages like those in personal injury or defamation cases
where the damages are to be fixed in the judgment of the the
trier fact.

The damages were complete, and interest is

necessary if Ranch Homes is to be fully compensated for the
injury.
Appellant also complains, but without citing any
authority, that interest should not have been awarded
because the plaintiff did not demand it, either in its
complaint or at the trials.
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But the comp] .:iint had
and it is usually held tllLlt

de11wncl for gc11eJ_cll n'lief (R:

Cl

i1

demitncJ for general reli(Cf

empowers the court to grdnt whatever relief the facts
pleaded and proved

re~uire.

Even if the complaint had cont<1ined no cJcr:1and for
general relief, rcspondont has the bcmcfi t of Hu le 54 (c)

(!),

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
Except as to a party ac;ainst 1·1ilom a judgrnc,nt is ecen~erc:
by default, every final judgment shall grant the r~1 1 ,
to which the party in whose favor it is n°nclered is -.
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such
relief in his pleadjngs. * * *
The demand for j udgrnent is not part of the statement
of the claim.

There is no possibility that the appellant

was misled by the failure to ask for interest in specific
terms, because interest is allowable as a matter of law,

a~i

the factual presentation would not have varied a whit.

v
The Costs Allowed by the Trial Court were Proper.
In its brief the appellant complains of (1) the

all~~

to respondent of costs incurred in connection with the first
trial; and (2) allowance of witness fees for attendance of
Fahs, Tuckett, and Kesler, three officers of Ranch Homes.
The verdict and judgment in favor of Ranch Homes in ti''
first trial was set aside by the trial court and a new trk
granted.

On the £",ccond trial judgrncnt was entered in favor

l Hornes agaJn,
·
a11c-1' the court ,~J.lc>1·.'cc1
cos':s
o f pain
1 · t'ff
l:
Ranc1
~
to plaintiff for both the first ancl scconc1 u-i"l"'·
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Fees to be paid witnesses are found in 21-5-8 Utah Code
Mnotatcd 1953, and the section also provides that witness
fees "may be taxed as costs against the losing party."
Another provision relating to costs is found in Rule
54(d) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Except when express provision therefor is made either
in the statutes of this state or in these rules, costs
shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party
unless the court otherwise directs; * * *
Without citing any authority, the appellant claims that
it was not the "losing party" and conversely, apparently,
that respondent was not the "prevailing party" in the trial
court.
But the rule doesn't segment cases for purposes of
costs.

There is only one prevailing party -- "the one who

in the end and on the entire case, no matter how diverse the
issues or the nature of them, is entitled to judgment."
Checketts v. Collings, 78 Utah 93, 1 P. 2d 950, 953 (1931).
In l!ughes v. Chicago, St. P., M.

&

O. Ry. Co., 126 Wis.

525, 106 ll.W. 526, 530 (1906), plaintiff had prevailed at
the first trial, but a new trial was granted.

He.then

prevailed on the second trial but the judgment was reversed
on appeal.

After the third trial, in which plaintiff was

again the prevailing party, the court refused to allow his
costs in the first two trials.

On appeal, the Wisconsin

Supreme Court held that costs for the fiist two trials
shoulcl have

bcc>C'll

01·10rdcd to plaintiff, saying:
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* * *Section 2918, Rev. St. 1898, reguJating costs.
broad and general and provides tllat "costs shall b ls
allowed as of course to the plaintiff in an actione·
the circuit court upon a recovery. * * *" This statln
clearly d oes not co1u.c.ine th e cos ts o f an action to aUte·
single trial, bu~ covers the costs of the action and j,
broad enough to include costs of former trials whc~ ·
the costs were not paid as a condition of the new
trial.
Such has been held to be the rule in other
states under similar statutes. * * * The lower court
therefore, erred in denying plaintiff's costs on the'
first and second trials.
[Citations omitted]
This case was followed in Wendt v. Finch, 235 Wis. 22o,
292 N.W.

890, 893

(1940).

In Mills v. Southwest Builders, Inc., 70 N.M. 407,

37~

P.2d 289, 296 (1962), the first trial ended in a mistrial
but the plaintiff prevailed on the second trial.

The trial

court, relying upon a rule of procedure substantially the
same as our Rule 54 (d) , held that because the jury failed to
return a .verdict the plaintiff was not the prevailing party
in the first trial and the costs of that trial should
allowed.

not~

The New Mexico Supreme Court said:

Section 21-1-1 (54) (d), NMSA 1953, quoted above, is
controlling.
What is included in "costs"? They are
defined as "statutory allowance to a party for his
expenses incurred in an action." [Citations omitted]~
find nothing in §21-1-1 (54) (d), or in the other section
noted by the trial court limiting "costs" to expenses
of trial, or of the last trial.
If on the first trial
a verdict had been reached, but on appeal there was a
reversal and a new trial ordered which again result~
in a verdict, the party ultimately prevailing would be
entitled to his proper expenses on the first trial, as
well as on the second.
Such is the prevailing rule.
[Citations omitted]

-
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other cases allowing costs for the first trial are
Brunnabcnd v. Tibbles, 76 Mont. 288, 246 P. 536, 539 (1926),
wherein plaintiff had prevailed at both trials, and Senior v.
Anderson, 130 Cal. 290, 62 P. 563, 567 (1900).
The appellant also contends that witness fees should
not have been paid for the attendance of Fahs, Tuckett and
Kesler, the officers of Ranch Hornes, relying upon Western
Creamery Co. v. Malia, 89 Utah 422, 57 P.2d 743, 746 (1936).
The reliance on Western Creamery is misplaced, however,
because the case is against the appellant's position.

There

the losing party contended that fees for one of the witnesses
should not have been allowed because he was an officer or
employee of the corporation helping with the conduct of the
trial.

The court recognized that one who is in court

"necessarily attending to the conduct of the suit" is not
entitled to a witness fee but added, as is true in this
case, that "there is nothing in this record that shows or
tends to show that Monson was in court attending to the
conduct of the trial."

The only thing we have in this case

is the appellant's naked statement to that effect in its
brief.
The fact that some of the witnesses did not testify on
each of the days they attended the trial does not preclude
the allowance of witness fees for them.

In Burtenshaw v.
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Bountiful Irr. Co., 90 Utah 196, 61 P.2d 312, 317 (1 936 ),
the court said:
~t is ~ettled in this state that the prevailing Parti,
is ent1 tled to tax as costs the statutory per diem l
0
witnesses subpoenaed in good faith and actually att '.
the trial even though they may not have testified e:n:·
day of attendance or at all.
Ci:

CONCLUSION
The appellant had a fair trial, in fact two fair tria!'
in which the jury and then the court found that Ranch Home:,
Inc., had been substantially damaged by the appellant's
breach of contract.
The evidence shows that the damages awarded to Ranch
Hornes were foreseeable in light of the negotiations of the
parties and the specific terms of the contract.

The

evi~[

also justifies the finding of fact that the damages awardei
were reasonable.

They were not shown to be unreasonable.

Both of these questions are fact questions, and both of
them, on the basis of conflicting evidence, were decided
against the appellant.

A holding that the only measure of damages in a contn:
in which there is an option to purchase real estate is the
difference between the contract price and the market value
at the time set for the conveyance would leave many part~
without a remedy.

It is an unrealistic and illogical type

of remedy in a case such as this where the parties were
dealing with much more than a simple sale of real estate,
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and were contemplating that the real property would be
developed and sold as a residential subdivision.

The cases

support the view that expenditures made in reliance upon the
contract should be allowed and, in addition, that where loss
of profits is shown such profits should be allowed if they
were within the reasonable contemplation of the parties -which they were in this case.
The defendant's arguments with respect to mitigation,

...

;

interest, and costs, appear to have been added to the brief
solely for the purpose of giving it weight.

The cases

clearly establish that there was no failure on the part of
the plaintiff to mitigate damages, and there is no evidence
showing what the extent of mitigation might have been.
Prejudgment interest is awardable in this state if the
damages are complete and they can be fixed by some ascertainable standard of value.

And the costs of both trials

for all of the witnesses called by the plaintiff were properly
allowed.
It's time this case came to an end.

The appellant has

had its days in court, a multitude of them, and the judgment
of the trial court should be affirmed with costs to respondent.
Respectfully submitted,

. . . . . . Aoe
Bryce E. Roe
David E. Leta
ROE AND FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
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